German Order of Battle for Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein (Introduction)

The order of battle for “Wacht am Rhein’ appears in the ‘Gliederung der Heersgrupe B fur den Befohlenen Angriff’ compiled by Ob.West and dated December 16. The descriptions of the German formations which I will be posting are set out under the commands which they belonged on December 16 according to that document; this order of battle was to change of course to tactical demands as the battle developed.
Besides the main fighting units, divisions and brigades, the document lists Herresgruppen (GHQ units), for under the flexible German military system, armies and corps were regarded as higher headquarters for directing whichever divisions they were assigned, and had very few organic units of their own, only services and administration. OKH allocated to the Heeresgruppe, depending on their battle requirements, additional fighting and specialist units and these formations, the Heerestruppen, were sub allocated to armies, corps and then divisions. For the most part they were artillery, engineer, or assault units. Again the details for these Heerestruppen units are current as on December 16.
  The exact strength of the panzer and panzergrenadier divisions on the eve of the offensive appears in “Meldung uber Stand der schwere Waffen der Panzer Divisionen” (Heavy Weapons Situation of the Panzer Divisions), issued on December 10 by Ob.West, which lists the situation in tanks, assault guns and field guns for fifteen divisions earmarked for the offensive. Ten of them would be actually involved in ‘Wacht am Rhein’. the other five being engaged later within Heeresgruppe G, mainly for the subsequent offensive “Nordwind’. The numbers of tank destroyers and assault guns equipping the various units engaged as Heerestruppen are found on the Ob.Situation maps for the start of the offensive.
 In fact, when the time came, because of its favored position Hitler’s scheme of things, 6.Panzer-Armee alone retaned is original strength as envisaged when the plan was drafted by Jodl in early October. The 5. Panzer-Armee possessed only three of the four panzer divisions once planned, the loss being made up by an extra infantry division. Even more drastic was the plight of 7.Armee. On Hitler’s instructions, its singular panzer formation was taken away and nothing arrived to replace it; of the six infantry divisions intended for 7. Armee just four had materialized by December. Yet regardless of this diminution in strength, drawn off in the preceding battles, Hitler held fast to the ambitious objectives he had conceived for the operation.