The Battle Approaches Villers
From 8.6.1944, the German resistance was organized around Tilly and the evening of the 9th saw the arrival of the famous Panzer-Lehr-Division, an armored demonstration and training division under General Bayerlein, who was ordered by Rommel to go onto the defensive in the west 12.SS-Panzer-Division ‘Hitlerjugend’.
The Panzer-Lehr-Division was an armored formation. It had 94 Pz.Kpfw.IVs and 89 Pz.Kpfw.V Panthers. It was recalled from Chartres and on the way, coming under attack by ‘Jabos’, it lost 90 trucks, 5 tanks, 84 half-tracks and mounted guns, numerous armored vehicles and 40 tankers filled with fuel.
In the front line, three German armored divisions, Panzer-Lehr-Division to the west, 12.SS-Panzer-Division ‘Hitlerjugend’ in the center and 21.Panzer-Division, formed with other divisions that had fought since June 6 a veritable shield that was hard to penetrate by frontal attacks. By now, the German army was making no serious attacking movements, being content to be pinned down on the defensive, to set up its armored units, join together all available troops and gather the units that had been held up were finally arriving one by one.
On the Allied side, the line up as follows:
-To the north and north-east of Caen the beachhead had been slightly widened since D-Day evening. The only progress made was removing the pocket at Douvres as the forces that landed at Sword Beach and at Juno Beach linked up.
-In the center, north of the Caen-Caumont road, the front formed a line through Brettvile-l’Orgueilleuse, Brouay, Cristot, Bucéels, château de Verriéres, château de Berniéres, La Belle epine and Torteval.
-Further west, in the Bessin area, the Americans, who had faced the most difficult situation at Vierville, Saint Laurent-sur-Mer and Colleville-sur-Mer on 6th June 6th made rapid progress south before the German reinforcements arrived. V Corps crossed the Aure on June 8th and passed the N13 highway; 29th Infantry Division passed through Isigny-sur-Mer and on June 9th reached the Vire river at the Vey bridge and the Elle River at Neuilly-le-Forét. On the 10th, 2nd Infantry Division and 1st Infantry Division raced south to Lison station, Balleroy and Caumont.
June 10: A dozen bombs fell on Villers and on the château farm. There was no casualties, but damage to property and throughout the area many window panes were blown out.
June 11: The Germans returned to the château. Two officers appeared, wishing to set up a hospital thee where the first wounded could be operated on. They began by placing a large red cross on the roof. In the front line, the situation developed slowly. Being unable to penetrate the German lines, Montgomery planned to use his two old Eighth Army divisions from North Africa, the 51st Highland Division and the 7th Armored Division, the “Desert Rats”, to attack in a pincer movement around Caen. The 51st Highland Division were to cross the beachhead held by the 6th Airborne Division on the eastern bank of the Orne while 7th Armored Division swung to the south-west.
The operation failed on the eastern flank. The German forces, the 346th and the 711th divisions flaked by elements of the 21.Panzer-Division, inflicted heavy losses on the 6th Airborne Division although it had massive support from the artillery, and on June 11th crushed the 51st Highland Division’s attack in under an hour.
Against the German forces in the middle of the front, west of Caen, the Allies set the Canadian 3rd Infantry Division and the British 50th Infantry Division. The latter formation came up against German defenses, and although it managed to infiltrate at Tilly, its lack of armored support prevented it from holding the town. This left the alternative of attempting to encircle the German forces from the west, with Villers-Bocage as the prime objective.
the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, which has landed at Omaha Beach and linked up with the 9th and 50th Infantry Division south of Por-en-Bessin, now encountered only small units of Germans with little weaponry. Racing through Cerisy Forest, the division, commanded by General Huebnar, reached Baleroy. By the 11th of June, it had reached Caumont.
When informed of this ‘lightning” offensive, British Second Army Commander General Dempsey and XXX Corps Commander General Bucknail came to the conclusion that there must be a certain weakness in the German lines, and considered moving General Erskine’s 7th Armored Division west and then have i make a broad sweeping movement to bring it round to Villers-Bocage and then south of Caen behind the German lines.
The scheme worked out by Allied Command was as follows:
On June 12th, to start from Buceéls and Douet de Chouain, then via Juaye-Mondaye, Saint Paul-du-Vernay and Cahagnolles, behind the lines held by the 50th Division, to reach the American sector, head off southwards along a road parallel to that taken by U.S. 1st Infantry Division as far as Livry, and finally to veer east towards Villers-Bocage along the Caumont-Villers road. This was General Montgomery placing all his confidence in a division he knew well, 7th Armored, to pull off a surprise attack behind German lines.