How one must attire one’s self when prepping for Unternehmen Wacht am Rhein research!

Fallschirmjager Gefreiter Klopper, Jager Meyer and Gefreiter Kalb during Wacht am Rhein.

Unternehmen Strösser

The 6. Panzer-Armee were informed on 10 December 1944 of another special mission, this time of a more orthodox nature, intended to facilitate its advances. This was Unternehmen Strösser, which called for airborne troops in the early hours of the first day behind the American positions in the north, to either open the roads in he Hohes Venn for the oncoming armor or to form a secure position between Eupen and Verviers during the period before a defensive front could be established.
 Chosen to command the operation was a much-decorated veteran of the airborne forces, Oberst Friedrich von der Heydte, who a short time before had been posted from commanding Fallschirm. Regt. 6,  fighting in Holland, to build a new paratroop training school at Aalten. The school had just started to function when, on 8 Dec. he was ordered to report at once to Generaloberst Kurt Student at the 1. Fallschirm. Armee headquarters at Dinxperlo, about ten kilometers to the south.
 He was ordered to form a Kampfgruppe of 800 men, taken from each of the  regiments of II. Fallschirmkorps. Because secrecy would have been compromised by moving an entire regiment. 

The order of battle for “Wacht am Rhein’ appears in the ‘Gliederung der Heersgrupe B fur den Befohlenen Angriff’ compiled by Ob.West and dated December 16. The descriptions of the German formations which I will be posting are set out under the commands which they belonged on December 16 according to that document; this order of battle was to change of course to tactical demands as the battle developed.
Besides the main fighting units, divisions and brigades, the document lists Herresgruppen (GHQ units), for under the flexible German military system, armies and corps were regarded as higher headquarters for directing whichever divisions they were assigned, and had very few organic units of their own, only services and administration. OKH allocated to the Heeresgruppe, depending on their battle requirements, additional fighting and specialist units and these formations, the Heerestruppen, were sub allocated to armies, corps and then divisions. For the most part they were artillery, engineer, or assault units. Again the details for these Heerestruppen units are current as on December 16.
  The exact strength of the panzer and panzergrenadier divisions on the eve of the offensive appears in “Meldung uber Stand der schwere Waffen der Panzer Divisionen” (Heavy Weapons Situation of the Panzer Divisions), issued on December 10 by Ob.West, which lists the situation in tanks, assault guns and field guns for fifteen divisions earmarked for the offensive. Ten of them would be actually involved in ‘Wacht am Rhein’. the other five being engaged later within Heeresgruppe G, mainly for the subsequent offensive “Nordwind’. The numbers of tank destroyers and assault guns equipping the various units engaged as Heerestruppen are found on the Ob.Situation maps for the start of the offensive.
 In fact, when the time came, because of its favored position Hitler’s scheme of things, 6.Panzer-Armee alone retaned is original strength as envisaged when the plan was drafted by Jodl in early October. The 5. Panzer-Armee possessed only three of the four panzer divisions once planned, the loss being made up by an extra infantry division. Even more drastic was the plight of 7.Armee. On Hitler’s instructions, its singular panzer formation was taken away and nothing arrived to replace it; of the six infantry divisions intended for 7. Armee just four had materialized by December. Yet regardless of this diminution in strength, drawn off in the preceding battles, Hitler held fast to the ambitious objectives he had conceived for the operation.

OKW RESERVE

Nine units appear in the Order of Battle of Heeresgruppe B as being in OKW reserve, of which five were being commited to ‘Wacht am Rhein’ by Heeresgruppe B and the other four by Heeresgruppe G, mainly for Operation “Nordwind”. By comparison Heeresgruppe B reserve consisted of one division-an indication of the degree  of initiative left to von Rundstedt and his senior commanders.
The five were:

Führer-Begleit-Brigade

As the Führer-Begleit-Battalion, the brigade originated in 1939 as a motorized escort unit for for the Führer and from 1941 was stationed near the Führerhauptquartier at Rastenburg. Elements were sent to the Eastern Front to gain battle experience but Russian pressure soon cause the bulk of the battalion to be sent into action, leaving only a small detachment on guard duties at the Wolfsschanze. In May 1944 it was expanded into a regiment and in November into the Führer-Begleit-Battalion. It soon moved west under the command of Oberst Otto Remer and detrained in the Daun area of the Eifel between December 10 and 13. Now organized as a fighting unit it contained:
a panzer regiment, an anti-aircraft regiment, and two motorized battalions of grenadiers plus a bicycle battalion, Gren.Btl.z.b.V. 928. Its panzer regiment was still embrionic: II. Abteilung of Panzer Regiment of ‘Gross Deutschland’ having been transferred to the brigade as its 1st Battalion, whilst Sturmgeschütz Brigade 200 acted as a substitute for its 2nd. According to the situation maps, on December 17 Panzer-Regiment ‘Führer-Begleit-Battalion’ then comprised: 1. Abteilung with twenty-three Panzer IVs and twenty sturmgeschütz: and (in place of II. Abteilung) 1. Abteilung with twenty-eight Sturmgeschütz.

Führer-Grenadier-Brigade

This unit originated in April 1943 as Führer-Grenadier-Battalion and fought as such on the Eastern Front. Raised to brigade strength  in April 1944 it was reorganized as as Fallingbostel in September as by mid-October was committed to 4.Armee against a Soviet breakthrough near Gumbinnen in East Prussia. At the end of November it withdrew to Cottbus for rest and refit. When the brigade moved moved west between December 11 and 17  its composition was: a panzer regiment, an anti-aircraft battalion, an artillery battalion, a panzergrenadier regiment of two motorized battalions and one bicycle battalion, Gren.Btl.z.b.V. 929.
The brigade commander was Oberst Hans-Jochim Kahler. On December 17, according to the situation maps, Panzer-Regiment “Füh.Grenadier-Brig.” comprised:
 1. Abteilung with eleven Panzer IVs and thirty-seven Panthers (a handful of them Jagdpanthers); standing in for II. Abteilung was Stu.Art.Brig.911 with thirty-four Sturmgeschütz.

9. Volks-Grenadier-Division

The Original 9. Infanterie-Division had been formed in 1935 as one of the early Wehrmacht divisions and had fought in the West in 1940 and on the Eastern Front from 1941. Destroyed in Romania in August 1944, it had been written off on October 9. he 9.Volks-Grenadier-Division which came into being on the west coast of Denmark on October 13 thus bore no resemblance to the former experienced infantry division of old but resulted merely from from a change of number, having been formed as 584. Volks-Grenadier-Division at Esbjerg, where it had been assembling since September; its Stu.Gesch.Kp.1009 equipped with the Jadgpanzer 38(t) at Milowitz in Czechoslovakia. The division moved out on December 14 and scheduled to detrain at Gerolstein, to be in readiness west of the town on December 19.

167. Volks-Grenadier-Division

The 167. Volks-Grenadier-Division was another of those veteran divisions which disintegrated itself on the Eastern Front and which disappeared in August of 1944 with 8. Armee in Romania. What remained of it, Divisiongruppe 197, was refitted Dollersheim with the remnants of 17. Luftwaffe-Feld-Division, shattered in France, to become the 167. Volks-Grenadier-Division on September 2, its Stu.Gesch.Kp. 1167 issued with the Jagdpanzer 38(t)at Milowitz. The division was due to arrive in the Gerolstein area December 24.

3. Panzergrenadier Division

As 3. Infanterie-Division it fought in Poland and the West, becoming a motorized infantry division in October 1940. From the summer of 1941 it fought in the East until it was destroyed at Stalingrad. Reformed in south-west France 386. Infanterie-Division (mot.), it became 3. Panzergrenadier-Division in June 1943. It fought in Italy until late August 1944 when ordered to France to counter tyhe Allied threat in Lorraine and then moved up to the Aachen sector, being pulled out at the beginning of December. On December 10 the division’s Panzer Abteilung 103 could field forty-one StuGs and its Panzerjäger-Abteilung 3 twenty-five Jagdpanzer IV/70s, although operational on the charts for the offensive the number of StuGs was put at twenty.

The other formations in the OKW reserve were 257. Volks-Grenadier-Division, 6. SS Gebirgs-Division, 11. Panzer-Division and 110. SS-Panzer-Division, none of which was commited as such, although elements(for instance part of SS-Panzer-Regiment 10) saw action with other units. The introduction of 11. Panzer-Division into the battle delayed by problems over its transfer to Heeresgruppe G in the south; a disagreement between von Rundstedt and the Heeresgruppe G commander, General Hermann Balck, about moving an entire Panzer division across a disjointed railway system, and such by December 18 the disruption was such that the move had to be called off.
 All von Rundstadt’s repeated requests for the deployment of these reserves were fruitless, except for both 9.VGD and 167. VGD which were ordered forward on December 23 albeit not released from OKW control. Three days later, when Model made another of his persistent demands to be allowed to make use of the OKW reserve-the armor specifically-he was given control of these two divisions. By this date the three divisions remaining in reserve were already earmarked for Operation ‘Nordwind’.

What are you, some sort of maniac?
I am an information freak, and I hate speaking on a subject I an not equipped enough on, write that off to academic vanity.
Why are you even bothering us with all this dribble about the Germans during the Battle of the Bulge?
I am bothering, because (a) to give folks a real picture as to the conditions of the German fighting man (b) to help elaborate just how desperate of a gamble this operation was.
Why not about the Allied side?
I am not qualified enough to speak on the Allied side of things. I feel there is others (Demons and Eindhoven) who can speak confidently on said subject.
Do you even have a life?
Having a life is subjective, something I feel is best left to your own devices, and not to the societal restraints inherit in our present day culture.

HEERESGRUPPE B RESERVE AND OTHER UNITS

The single division in reserve on the eve of the Ardennes offensive over which Heeresgruppe B had direct control over was 79. Volks-Grenadier-Division.

79. Volks-Grenadier-Division

The original 79. Intraterie-Division had been destroyed during the summer around Jassy in Romania. The new 79. Volks-Grenadier-Division came into being on October 27 by a change in number of 586. VGD, which was assembling at Thorn (Torun) in Poland since September. When it left for the West on December 11 the division was in poor shape, and lacking in transport and with neither its anti-aircraft nor anti-tank units. Its Stu.Gesch.Kp.1179, equipping with Jagdpanzer 38(t) at Mielau, failed to appear in time.

Engineers

The range of engineer units available to Heresgruppe B included construction
engineers (baupionier-battalions) and others required for different tasks-for instance, Schneeräum-Kompanie 226 to carry out snow clearance. Different altogther were the combat or assault engineers (pionier-battalions) and such units as the Panzer-Pionier-Kompanie 813 equipped with miniature wire-guided tracked ‘Goliath’ demolition charge carriers.
 Four bridging columns were allotted: Brückenkolonne or Brüko 888, Brüko 921, Brüko 969, Brüko 956, each with standard Brückengerät B steel pontoon briding equipment capable of spanning a fiver fifty meters wide and bearing up to ten tons, or half width and taking double the weight. (Brückengerät J pontoon bridging equipment which could span up to eighty-five meters and take up to 30 tons-or fourty meters and seventy tons-was also in service with the armies)
 There was also two labor regiments of OT-Brigade 5 belonging to the Reich’s utility service and semi-military, all-purpose construction and engineering concern, Organization Todt. Taking OT-Regiment 2 as an example, it consisted at that time of 1,500 German and 800 foreign workers.

Artillery

A unit of long-range railway guns was alloted to Heeresgruppe B. This was the Eisenbahn-Artillerie-Abteilung 725, comprising three batteries: E-Battr. 674, with one 24cm Th.Br. K gun having a range of 28 kilometers; one 24cm Th.K. gun, range 28 kilometers, and one 27.4 cm K 592(f) gun, range 30 kilometers; E-Bttr. 668, with one 28cm K 5 gun, range 60 kilometers and E-Battr. 749 with two 28cm K 5 gl. which had a purported range of up to 125 kilometers!

15. Armee

As the opening of the attack failed to create the conditions for the follow-up operation in the north 15. Armee was not involved as planned, and on December 18 the two mobile divisions asigned for the thrust from the Venlo area-the 9. Panzer-Division and the 15. Panzergrenadier-Division - were placed in OKW reserve amd moved south to the Eifel from where they were committed to the battle. Later two infantry divisions were moved south: 340.Volks-Grenadier-Division and 246.Volks-Grenadier-Division.

9.Panzer Division

Formed in January 1940 from 4. Leichte-Division, it fought in the Netherlands, Belgium and France; then in 1941 in the Balkans and Southern Russia, moving to the central section in October and taking part in in the summer offensive in 1942 and at Kursk in 1943. Transferred to the southern sector again in the autumn, it was heavily engaged in the battles in the Dneper bend and, having sustained continuing heavy losses from late 1943, was withdrawn from in March 1944 to Southern France where it was combined 155. Reserve-Panzer-Division. It was moved up to fight in Normandy  in August. After the withdraw from France, it was engaged in the Venlo counter-attack and in counter attacks in the Aachen area against the First US Army. After undergoing a short-term refit it was earmarked for ‘Wacht am Rhein’. On December 10 the division’s Panzer-Regiment 33 was at the following operational strength: I. Abteilung, twenty-eight Panzer IVs; and II Abteilung, thirty-seven Panthers. The Division’s Panzerjäger Abteilung 50 had ten Jagdpanzer IV/70s operational.

15. Panzergrenadier-Division

Formed in May 1943 as Division Sizilien (Sicilian) and incorporating the remnants which escaped from Tunisia, it was designated 15. Panzergenadier-Division in July and fought in Italy until the beginning of September 1944, when transferred to France. In Lorraine it fought in attempting to counter the Allied advance in the West and in subsequent local counter-attacks, being moved north and engaging in similar attacks from the end of October in the Venlo and Aachen sectors. On December 10 its Panzer Abteilung 115 possessed fourteen IVs and thirty StuGs, and its Panzerjäger-Abteilung 33 twenty Jagdpanzer IV/70s and eight Stugs.

Artillery

In addition to those artillery units with its thirteen divisions 15. Armee was assigned:
a) three volks-artillerie corps-
Volks-Art.Korps 403, Volks-Art.Korps 407 and Volk-Art.Korps 409;
b) two battalions of light guns-
H.Art.Abt.843 and H.Art.Abt.992;
c) one battalion of heavy mortors-
Mörs.Abt.628;
d) one battery of heavy guns-
Fest.Art.Bttr. 1076;
e) six battalions of heavy guns-
H.Art.Abt. 1193, H.Art.Abt. III/139, Fest.Art.Abt. 1513, Fest.Abt. 1301, Fest.Art.Abt.1308, Fest.Art.Abt.1310
 According to the document ‘Artillerie-Ausstattung der Herresgruppe B’ dated December 14 this brought the artillery strength of 15. Armee to 792 guns and mortars, of which 177 were 155mm or over-a total length of the 100-kilometer front held by 15. Armee, part of it outside the area of projected operations.

Assault Units

Alloted to 15. Armee were two assault gun brigades, Stu.Gesh.Brig. 902 and Stu.Gesh.Brig. 341; two assault gun companies, Stu.Mörs.Kp. 1000 and Stu.Mörs.Kp. 1001, equipped with the huge Tiger Mörser, and a battalion of towed anti-tank guns, the Pz.Jg.Abt.(mot.Z)682. Like most of the German units at this date, they were below strength. Stu.Gesch.Brig. 902 possessed twenty StuGs on the eve of the offensive; the nominal establishment for such a brigade being over forty-five. There were only three Tiger Mörsers in Stu.Mörs.Kp. 1000 and four in Stu.Mörs.Kp. 1001; so, for all its impressive size, this mobile assault rocket launcher which fired 380mm spin-stabilized projectiles was too few in number to be of more than limited tactical value.
  Some of 15. Armee’s artillery and assault gun units were transferred south to the attacking armies. Thus Stu.Gesch.Brig. 902 and the two Stu.Mörs.Kp. were already assigned to 6.Panzer-Armee on December 16.

Engineers

To supplement its divisions’ engineers 15. Armee received the following units: Pionier-Btl. 16 (assault engineers);Baupionier-Btl. 434 (construction engineers); bridging columns Brüko 992, Brüko 885 (both with B equipment) and Brüko 914 (with J equipment); and two regiments of OT-Brigade 2.

6. Panzer Armee

The army staff only had recently been formed, on September 24, around the remnants of XII. Armeekorps destroyed in July near Minsk, with the addition of members of the staff of the Wehrmacht command for Belgian and northern France and from the Waffen SS. SS-Oberstgruppenführer ‘Sepp’ Dietrich assumed command of the army upon its activation.

LXVII. Armeekorps
 The corps staff originated on September 24, 1942, as LXVII Reservekorps for overseeing reserve divisions in the West and its headquarters were in Brussels. On January 20,1944, it became LXVII. Armeekorps and as part of 15.Armee spent the year in France and the Netherlands. The corps commander was Generalleutnant Otto Hitzfeld.

272. Volks-Grenadier-Division

The former 272 Infanterie-Division was badly mauled in Normandy and what remained was set to Döberitz and included in the 575. Volks-Grenadier assembling there since August. On September 17 this was redesignated 272.Volks-Grenadier-Division. Its Stu.Gesch.Kp.1272 was equipped with the Jagdpanzer 38(t) at Milowitz. The Division left Döberitz at the beginning of November and took over part of the West Wall in the Monschau area, where the end of the month it came under increasing pressure from V Corps of the First Army driving from the Rur (Roer) dams.

362.Volks-Grenadier-Division

The Volks-Infanterie-Division had been destroyed in Normandy and, on September 4, 1944 a new 326.Volks-Grenadier-Division was created by giving the number to the 579.Volks-Grenadier-Division assembling at Kaposvar in Hungary. It was moved to the Eifel in November and stationed near Gerolstein. The original intention was for it to attack with the LVIII. Panzer-Korps of 5.Panzer-Armee, but as it was insufficiently mobile-being some 400 horsesshort, besides vehicles-it became part of LXVII. Armee-Korps with the 6.Panzer-Armee on the northern wing of the attack where less distance had to be covered, assembling in the Kall area on December 10. Its Stu.Gesh.Kp. 1326 was equipped with Jagdpanzer 38(t) at Milowitz.

I.SS-Panzerkorps

The corps was formed on July 27, 1943, in Berlin Lichterfelde. It served on the southern sector of the Eastern Front until in the end of year and was then transferred west to take command of the 1.SS-Panzer-Division and 12.SS-Panzer-Division. It was heavily involved Normandy battles and the subsequent withdrawal across France. SS-Gruppenführer Hermann Preiss had taken command of the corps during the refitting period just before “Wacht am Rhein’.

277.Volks-Grenadier-Division

the 277.Infanterie-Division had been badly battered in Normandy and its remnants moved to Hungary and incorporated in the 574.Volks Grenadier-Division assembling in the Budapest area since August. The change of number 277 took place on September 9. On November 5 the division left Budapest for the West to take over part of the West Wall in the Losheim area. It was to experienced difficulties in moving into the assembling area during the two nights preceding the offensive: one of its battalions was not relieved in the line as planned, and the attack had to go ahead without it. Krämer considered the division to have been at eighty percent strength. Its Stu.Gesch.Kp.1277 was equipped with the Jagdpanzer 38(t) at Milowitz and could field six assault-guns on the eve of the offensive.

12.Volks-Grenadier-Division

As 12. Infanterie-Division, before it was merely re-designated 12.Volks-Grenadier-Division on October 9, 1944 it had fought with distinction in Poland, France and on the Eastern Front before being transferred to the West in September, where it had fought on the Aachen sector. It was withdrawn from the battle sone near Jülich and Düren during the night of December 2 for a brief rest and refit near Blankenheim. When it moved into the assembly area near Scheid it was estimated by Krämer as having been at eighty percent strength. According to the division’s commander Generalmajor Gerhard Engel, the rough number of assault guns received by its Stu.Gesch.Kp. 1012 at Mielau amounted to six StuGs. An experienced division, in good shape, it was regarded by 6.Panzer-Armee as the best of that armies infantry Division.

3.Fallschirmjäger-Division

Formed in France in October 1943, it fought in Normandy the following summer and suffered heavily around Saint-Lô and in the Falaise pocket. During October it was withdrawn to Oldenzaal in Holland for refitting; most of the replacement troops being Luftwaffe ground personnel. With the promotion of its famous commander, Generalmajor Richard Schimpf, the division was taken over by Generalmajor Walther Wadehn. As few of the replacements had any experience of fighting infantry as infantry, this created a considerable headache for its newly-assigned officers. The new Chief-of-staff had no idea of what was involved in ground operations, which meant that the Chief-of-staff of I.SS=Panzerkorps, to which the division had been assigned, had to ask 6.Panzer-Armee for his immediate replacement by someone who did! On the eve of December 16 the division have been able to move only two regiments into this assembly area near Hallschlag and launched its attack with them alone; the third coming up the following night. According to Krämer the division was at seventy-five percent strength and had no assault-guns.

12.SS-Panzer-Division ‘Hitlerjugend’

Formed as a panzergrenadier division in July 1943 and re-designated a panzer division in October, it first went into action June 7 in Normandy and was heavily engaged in the vicinity of Caen, becoming one of the rearguard which fought to keep the Falaise Pocket from being closed. Having suffered considerable losses in Normandy and the subsequent withdraw across France, the division was ordered to the Suligen area un the north-west Germany for rest and refitting. Its well-known commander, SS-Oberführer Kurt Meyer, nicknamed ‘Panzermeyer’, had been taken prisoner during the retreat in September and SS-Standartenführer Hugo Kraas took over the division on November 9.
 When the division moved into the assembly area near Sistig, according to Chief-of-staff of 6. Panzer-Armee. SS-Brigadeführer Fritz Krämer, it was at ninety percet strength in manpower and eighty percent in equipment. On December 10 its SS-Panzer-Regiment 12 consisted of: I. Abteilung with thirty-eight Panthers   and thirty-nine panzer IVs;  standing in for II. Abteilung was Schwere-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 560 with about twenty-five Jagdpanzer IV/70s and one company of of Jagdpanthers. The division’s SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 12 had twenty-two Jagdpanzer IV/70s.

1.SS-Panzer-Division ‘Leibstandarte-SS Adolf Hitler’

Formed as a motorized division in 1941 from the expansion of elements of Hitler’s bodyguard unit, which had served in Poland, and the West, it fought in the Balkans and the suothern section of the Eastern Front, being designated a panzer division while in France during the later half of 1942. Except for a brief period in Northern Italy (August-October 1943) it remained on the Eastern Front. Heavily engaged west of Kiev, it was transferred to belgium for rest and refitting in the spring of 1944. It was then angaged against the invasion sustaining heavy losses in the Normandy battles-including Mortain-and the withdrawal from France, and was refitted near siegburg in Westphalia in November. The young conscripts for this once hand-picked elite formation were described by the commander of its SS-Panzer-Regiment 1 as ‘pretty good considering the standard replacements assigned at that time’. According to Krämer, when the division moved to its assembly area near Stadtkyll it was almost ninety percent strength in man-power and eighty percent in equipment. On December 10 the I. Abteilung of SS-Panzer-Regiment 1 could field thirty-seven  Panthers and thirty-four Panzer IVs, and Schwere-SS-Panzer-Abteilung 501, attached in the absence of the panzer regiment’s II. Abteilung, could field fifteen Tiger IIs. The division’s SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 1 possessed ten Jagdpanzer IV/70s. A further thirty Tigers were in the process of being delivered, and it could be that half of them reached them actually reached the front, as the situation map for December 17 show thirty Tigers with the division.

II.SS-Panzerkorps

Created in July 1942 as the SS-Panzer-Generalkommando, it became knows as II.SS-Panzerkorps in July 1943 . The corps served on the Eastern Front during the Kharkov and Kursk battles and moved to Italy in the summer of 1943. Then after a period in France, it moved east again to the Tarnopol area in April 1944. With the Allied landings in Normandy it was hurredly ordered west to face the invasion and subsequently withdrew to Germany in autumn, Its commander was SS-Obergruppenführer Wilhelm Bittrich.

2.SS-Panzer-Division ‘Das Reich’

A motorized infantry division formed during the winter of 1940-41 from the bulk of SS-Verfugüngstruppe-Division, it fought in the Balkans and on the central sector of the Eastern Front, becoming a panzergrenadier division in November 1942 whilst in France during the second half of that year. It took part in the recapture of Kharkov in March 1943 and the battles in the south, it was withdrawn to France for rest and refit in February 1944 after suffering heavy losses west of Kiev, having been designated a panzer division the previous October. after fighting in Normandy, its extraction from the Falaise Pocket and withdrawal across Fance had brought it to the Schnee Eifel area, behind the West Wall, and it had to be refitted again near Paderborn in the autumn. According to Krämer, when it moved into its assembly area near Satzvey the division was up to eighty percent of its designated strength
On December 10 its armored regiment, SS-Panzer-Regiment 2, comprised: I.Abteilung, fifty-eight Panthers; II.Abteilung twenty-eight Panzer IVs and twenty-eight Sturmgeschütz. The division’s SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 2 reported twenty Jagdpanzer IV/70s Operational.

9.SS-Panzer-Division ‘Hohenstaufen’

Formed at the beginning of 1943 as a panzergrenadier division, it completed its assembly and training in nort-east France and became a panzer division in October 1943. It was moved to the Ukraine in March 1944 and fought in the Tarnopol sector, then June was ordered to return to France with II.SS-Panzer-Korps to counter the Allied invasion of Normandy. After the retreat it was only twenty percent of its normal composition early in September when quartered in Arnhem, yet shortly afterwards it played a major part in defeating the Allied airborne landings. From October it was reorganized and refitted near Münsteeifel, and according to to Krämer was at seventy-five percent when it was mustered to the south in its assembly area in Schönau.On December 10 the operational strength of its SS-Panzer-Regiment 9 was I.Abteilung, thirty-five Panthers and twenty-eight StuGs; II.Abteilung thirty-nine Panzer IVs and twenty-eight StuGs. The division’s SS-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 9 reported twenty-one Jagdpanzer IV/70s.

Assault Units

The 6. Panzer-Armee was assigned two assault gun brigades, Stu.Gesch.Brig.394 and Stu.Gesch.Brig.667; and assault gun battalion, Stu.Pz.Abt. 217, equipped with the Sturmpanzer IV ‘Brummbär’;and a battalion of towed anti-tank guns, the Pz.Jg.Abt.(mot.Z) 683.
 Needless to say, even the favored Waffen SS army units could not expect to receive units at full strength. On December 17 the two brigades could only field eight StuGs between them, and the battalion only eight Brummbärs, although December 25 the situation had improved somewhat, in that the two brigades had then twenty-five StuGs between them.
 Other units assigned later were: two battalions of Tigers, Schwere-Panzer-Abteilung 506 and Schwere-Abteilung (FK1) 301, and one of Panzerjägers, Schwere-Panzerjäger-Abteilung519, equipped with Jagdpanthers. On December 17 the two panzer battalions could field twenty-two Tigers and Schwere-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 519 twenty-one Jagdpanthers and Stugs.

Artillery

Apart from the artillery with its nine divisions 6. Panzer-Armee had the following units placed under its command:
a) three volks-artillerie corps-
Volks.Art.Korps. 338,Volks.Art.Korps. 402 and Volks.Art.Korps. 405
b) three volks-werfer brigades-
Volks.Werf.Brig.4, Volks.Werf.Brig.9 and Volks.Werf.Brig.17;
c) four heavy mortar batteries-
Mörs.Bttr. 1110, Mörs.Bttr. 1098, Mörs.Bttr. 1120 and Mörs.Bttr.428;
d) one heavy battery of heavy artillery-
Fest.Art.Bttr.1123
 This gave the army a total of 685 guns, though only 180 of there were 150mm or over, and 340 rocket launchers of which 214 were 150mm, 108 were 210mm and 18 were 300mm.

Engineers

Again, comparatively well off, 6.Panzer-Armee was alloted these additional units:
a) three engineer battalions-
Pi.Btl.73, Pi.Btl. 253 and Pi.Btl.62;
b) two construction engineers battalions-
Baupionier-Btl. 798 and Baupionier-Btl.59;
c) one bridge building battalion-
Pi.Brück.Btl. 655;
d) five bridging columns equipped with Brückengerät B-
Brücko 602, Brücko 2/406, Brücko 1/403, Brücko 967 and Brücko 968
e) four bridging columns equipped with Brückengerät J-
Brücko 895, Brücko 844, Brücko 851 and Brücko 175
 Four Regiments of OT-Brigade 4 were also allotted to it.

6. PANZER-ARMEE

When ‘Wacht am Rhein” began early on 16 December 1944 there were eight hours and six minutes of daylight ahead, from sunrise at 8.29 a.m. to sunset at 4.35 p.m. CET (taking Bastogne as reference point) with just another thirty-eight minutes of twilight at both dawn and dusk: a short winters day.
  For the Americans, caught off guard, the shock of the opening phase of the offensive was to turn into a defeat for a number of front-line units, whilst for the Germans, striking such a stunning blow brought about the resurgence in moral that possessed undertone of the blitzkrieg of former years.
  At 12.45 p.m. CET a report from Heeresgruppe B savoured some of the American radio messages it quoted: ‘We have been bypassed. What should we do?’
‘The guns are useless now. What should we do.’ Reply: ‘Blow up the guns’ , and We are withdrawing six miles to build up a new front line.”
 Hitler once more sensed the excitement of victory. Placing a call to Heeresgruppe G, south of the offensive, he spoke with its commander, General der Panzertruppen Hermann Balck. His voice taut with emotion, Hitler rasped, ‘Balck, Balck, everything has changed in the West! Success-complete success-it’s now in our grasp!’
  For the planners of ‘Wacht am Rhein’, however, indications had started to come in after only a few hours that things were not going according to plan.

On 15 Dec., the eve of the historic offensive, code-named Wacht Am Rhein (Watch on the Rhine) Hitler held a final conference with his staff at his new temporary headquarters, the Führerhauptquartier ‘Adlerhorst’, located bear Bad Nauheim, north of Frankfurt. Reports confirmed several days of bad weather could be expected, effectively grounding enemy aircraft. That evening he dined with his secretaries and as he retired at 0500 hours, one hundred miles to the west, thousands of German troops attacked along a weakly held eighty-five mile sector of the four hundred and fifty miles of British-American front.
Hitler’s last gamble in the West has begun.

5.Panzer-Armee

The first 5. Panzer-Armee had fought in Africa and disappeared with the capitulation of Tunisia in May 1943. A new one originated from France as Panzer Gruppen Kommando West on January 24, 1944; under the command of General Geyr von Scweppenburg it faced the Allied invasion in Normandy and became the 5.Panzer-Armee in August 1944. General Hasso Mantueffel took command on September 12 and led it in the Lorraine battles and around Aaechen.

LXVI.Armeekorps
Created as the LXVI. Reservekorps to take command of second line divisions within Ob.West on September 21, 1942,it became the LXVI Armeekorps on February 25 the following year. The corps was based  at Clermond-Ferrand when the Allied breakout from Normandy forced its withdraw to Germany. In December 1944 its commander was General der Artillerie Walter Lucht.
 

18.Volks-Grenadier-Division

From being the 571. Volks-Grenadier-Division assembling at Ersbjerg in Denmark with the usual gamut of conscripts filling in the gaps around the remnants of the 18. Luftwaffe-Feld-Division , it was renamed the 18.Volks-Grenadier-Division on Spetember 2, 1944. Oberleutnant i. G. Dietrich Moll, chief-of-staff of the new division, gave an insight into the activation of the division in Denmark: ‘The division was allocated a cadre of 2,500 men from the Luftwaffe division near the Siene in August and 3,000 men from other Luftwaffe and naval units. The division also received 5,000 men, largely rehabilitated personnel, combed out of the various establishments in the zone of the interior, the so-called ‘indispensables’ who hitherto had occupied key positions in industry. These groups also included very few recent draftees so that the personnel of the division could scarcely be described as young. Not many of the officers or men had seen much action, a fact which was to bear significantly on the coming operations. Germany was in her sixth year of war, yet few men of this division had campaign ribbons or decoration.’
 It was put into the line at the end of October to take over a section of the West Wall north of the Schnee Eifel, a quiet sector in which it was able to rotate units, thus providing its conscripts with some experience  and training the majority of them badly lacked and licking the division into shape/ Its Stu.Gesh.Kp. 1818, equipped at Milowitz, possessed fourteen Jagdpanzer 38(t). 

62.Volks-Grenadier-Division

As the 583. Volks-Grenadier-Division it began from scratch assembling at Neuhammer early in September 1944, and although from September 22 it bore the number of  the 62. Infanterie-Division destroyed near Jassy in Romania during the summer, there was no connection between the two. From Neuhammer it was moved at that end of November to the Wittlich area, and from there during the night of December 15 into a part of the line held previously by elements of the 26. Volks-Grenadier-Division which was shifting southwards into its own attack positions. The division’s Stu.Gesh.Kp. 1162 possessed fourteen Jagdpanzer 38(t) with which it was equipped at Milowitz.

LVIII. Panzerkorps

Created on July 28, 1943, as the LVIII.Reservekorps, it took part in the occupation of Hungary (Operation ‘Margarethe’) in March 1944 and then moved west, It became LVIII. Panzerkorps on July 7 and as such was heavily engaged against the Allied in Normandy; in the atumn it was engaged in Lorraine. The corps commander was General der Panzertruppen Walter Krger who had taken command in February 1944.

116. Panzer-Division

The original 16. Infanterie-Division had been motorized in Spetember 1940 and took part in the Balkans campaign and the invasion of Russia. Being re-designated a panzergrenadier division on the Eastern Front in March 1943, it distinguished itself in the Ukraine in the Zaporozhe area but was badly battered near Uman and withdrawn to France where it was refitted with elemnts of 179. Reserve-Panzer-Division to become the 116. Panzer-Division on March 1944. It fought in Normandy and the ensuing withdrawal across France, which tok it to Aaechen , and had to be refitted again near Düsseldorf. During the Aachen battles its highly-decorated commander, Generalleutnant Gerhard Graf von Schwerin was relieved following serious allegations of about his loyalty made by Nazi officials, prominent among them was Gauleiter Grohe and Reichsführer Himmler. Von Schwerin (who in February 1945 was promoted to LXXVI. Panzerkorps in Italy.) was succeeded on September 14 by Oberst Siegfried von Waldenburg, promoted to Generalmajor on November 1. On December 10 the division’s Panzer-Regiment 16 consisted of I.Abteilung with forty-three Panthers operational and II. Abteilung with twenty-six Panzer IVs. The division’s Panzerjger-Abteilung 228 reported thirteen Jagdpanzer IV/70s operational.

560.Volks-Grenadier-Division

The Division was formed on October 10 at Moss in Norway and incorporated various elements of garrison units stationed in Norway and Denmark. By the eve of the attack only half of its men had arrived, the rest making their was by foot or train.
As the division’s commander, Generalmajor Rudolf Bader, was in the hospital at the time, the initial assault was led by the commander of one of its infantry regiments, Oberst Rudolf Langhaeuser, Grenadier-Regiment 1128, who handed over to Bader on his return on December 27. The division’s Stu.Gesch.Kp. 1560 was equipped with the Jagdpanzer 38(t) at Milowitz but it would seem none of its assault guns were present when the attack opened; just ten being available some days later.

XXXXVII. Panzerkorps

Created as the (mot.) XXXXVII. Armeekorps, it became a Panzerkorps on June 21, 1942. From June 1941 to April 1944 the corps commanded units on the Eastern Front before being transferred to the West. It faced an Allied invasion and was later involved in the Lorraine battles. The corps was under command of General der Panzertruppen Heinrich von Lüttwitz

2.Panzer-Division

One of the original three panzer divisions, it was formed on October 15, 1935 at Würzburg and after the Anschluss of March 1938 remained in Vienna. It fought in Poland and France; then in April 1941 in Greece. From there it returned to France and in September joined the drive on Moscow, continuing to fight on the central sector and taking part in the Kursk offensive in the summer of 1943, until transferred to France early in 1944 for refitting after losses suffered defending the middle Dneper. Heavily engaged in Normandy, after withdrawal from France to the West Wall it was in a bad way and was transferred again to rest and refit near Wittlich. A new divisional commander, Oberst Meinrad  von Lauchert, took over the very day before the offensive and arrived when the division was already in the assembly area near Neurburg. The division was then about eighty percent strength. On December 10 the Panzer Regiment 3 reported forty-nine Panthers operational in I. Abteilung and twenty-six Panzer IVs and twenty four StuGs in II. Abteilung. The division’s Panzerjäger-Abteilung 38 reported twenty-one StuGs operational.

Panzer-Lehr-Division

Formed on January 10, 1944 around the staff and instructors of Krampnitz panzer training school from the demonstration units of various other training schools, which naturally made it something of a crack unit, the division took part in the occupation of Hungary (Operation ‘Margarethe’) in March 1944 and was moved to France in May.  In Normandy it proved one of the main obstacles to the breakout from the bridgehead. It suffered heavily in the Caen and Saint Lô sectors and after the withdrawal across France was transferred to Paderborn to refit. Although already ear marked for ‘Wacht am Rhein’, it committed in late November against a thrust by the American Third Army in the Saar and therefore had to undergo an emergency refit around Mayen in early December. To make good on its losses, the missing I. Abteilung of the Division’s Panzer-Regiment 130 had been replaced by the Schwere-Panzerjäger-Abteilung 559, with about fifteen Jagdpanthers and StuGs; II. Abteilung having twenty-three Panthers and thirty Panzer IVs. The division’s Panzerjäger-Abteilung 130 had fourteen Jadgpanzer IV/70s. When the Panzer-Lehr-Division moved into its assembly area near Kyllburg to take part n ‘Wacht am Rhein’ with 5. Panzer-Armee, it was at about eighty percent strength. The divisional commander was Generalleutnant Fritz Bayerlein.

26.Volks-Grenadier-Division

Continuously engaged on the Eastern Front since July 1941, the 26.Infanterie-Division was withdrawn for refitting to Poznan, Poland, in September 1944 after the punishing battles of the summer in the Ukraine. Merged Poznan with the 582. Volks-Grenadier-Division which had been assembling there since August, the resultant formation which still had the structure of one of the old infanterie divisions was re-designated as 26.Volks-Grenadier-Division on September 17. Most of its new troops came from the Kriegsmarine, and they were able to blend quickly with the battle-tried members of the old division, so its renamed counterpart continued in good stead. At the end of November-almost at full strength-it took over positions on the West Wall in the Dasburg area, where it was to launch its attack. (It also happened to be well off for horses, having about 5,000 of them including some hardy beasts from Russia.), It Stu.Gesch.Kp. 1026, which moved up from Milowitz, possessed fourteen Jagdpanzer 38(t)

Assault Units

An assault gun brigade, namely Stu.Gesh.Brig.224 and a Panzerjäger battalion, s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 653, were assigned to 5. Panzer-Armee. Both were under strength, the brigade having only fourteen StuGs and the battalion nine Jagdtigers. The Jagdtigers were not used as the unit was moved south for Unternehmen ‘Nordwind’. Pz.Jg.Abt. 741 and St.Gesch.Brig. 243 were assigned later to the army; the former having twenty Jadgpanzer 38(t) and the later twenty StuGs on December 17.

Artillery

Apart from the artillery within its seven divisions, 5.Panzer-Armee received:
a) three volks-artillerie corps-
Volks-Art.Korps 401, Volks-Art.Korps 410 and Volks-Art.Korps 766;
b) three volks-werfer brigades-
Volks-Werf.Brig. 7, Volks-Werf.Brig. 15 and Volks-Werf.Brig. 16
c) one medium howitzer battalion-
H.Art.Abt.460
d) three heavy batteries-
H.Art.Bttr. 1094, H.Art.Bttr. 1095 and Fest.Art.Battr.25/975;
e) four heavy mortar batteries-
Mörs.Bttr.1119, Mörs.Bttr.1099, Mörs.Bttr. 1121 and Mörs.Bttr.638.
This brought its total to 596 guns, or which no more than 180 were 150mm or over, and 367 rocket launchers-232 of 150mm, 81 of 210mm and 54 of 300mm.

 Engineers

5.Panzer-Armee was alloted these additional engineer units:
a) two combat engineer battalions-
Pi.Btl.600 and Pi.Btl. 207;
b) two construction engineer battalions
Baupionier-Btl. 803 and Baupionier-Btl. III/999
c) four bridge columns equipped with Brückengerät B-
Brückengerät 22, Brücko 6, Brücko 1/409 and Brücko 957
d) foru bridging columns equipped with with Brückengerät J-
Brüko 850, Brüko 846, Brüko 894  and Brüko 892.
It was also allotted four regiments of OT-Brigade 3. 

7.Armee

The Army was created August 25, 1939, and in 1940 took part in the Battle of France. It remained as army of occupation in Brittany and Normandy and in June 1944 found itself facing the allied invasion. It subsequently withdrew to Germany and took responsibility for defending part of the West Wall. General Erich Brandenberger assumed command on September 3, 1944.

LXXXV. Armeekorps

Created as Generalkommando Kneiss in October 1943 in southern France, it was attached to 19. Armee until December 2, 1944, when it became LXXXV. Armeekorps and transferrred to 7. Armee. Its commander was General der Infanterie Baptist Kniess.

5.Fallschirmjäger-Division

 This paratrooper formation was created in March 1944 but it was virtually destroyed in the Falaise Pocket, and, when re-formed in the Netherlands from ex-Luftwaffe ground personnel, it was but a shadow of its former self. The replacements-officers and men- were poorly trained for their role as infantry, and there was a lack of cohesion to the extent that during the offensive individual units quite often went completely their own way regardless!
 Responsibility for this poor state of affairs fell to the lot of its commander, Generalmajor Ludwig Heilmann, a Fallschirmjäger veteran of Crete and Russia who had won fame at the head of Fallschirmjäger-Regiment 3 in Sicily and Italy and been awarded the Swords to the Knight’s Cross at Monte Cassino. The division moved into the Bitburg area at the begining of December and was not badly off for assault guns as it was given the support of Fsch.Stu.Gesch.Brig. 11, under the command of Oberstleutnant Hollander, though inevitably below strength, at twenty, according to Oberst i. G. Rudolf von Gersdorff, the army chief-of-staff.

352. Volks-Grenadier-Division

The original 352. Infanterie-Division had been destroyed in Normandy during the summer, and 352. Volks-Grenadier-Division came into being on September 21 by changing the number of the 581. Volks-Grenadier-Division then assembling on the border with Denmark at Flensburg. Its replacements came mainly came from the Kriesgmarine who therefore possessed little of no fighting experience of ground fighting after a period of training which lasted to mid-November, the division was moved to the Bitburg area to complete its organization, and by the end of the month had taken over a section of the West Wall between Viaden and Echternach. The division’s commander, Oberst Erich Schmidt, considered it to be more than in good shape for a volks-grenadier division, as it was almost at full strength and displayed a good fighting spirit. Its Stu.Gesch.Kp. 1352, formed at Milowitz, was said by Schmidt to have possessed no more than about  half a dozen Jagdpanzer 38(t) at the start of the offensive.

LXXX. Armeekorps

This corps was created in western France from the Höh.Kdo.z.b.V. XXXI and had its headquarters at Poitiers. It had been attached to 1. Armee unit October 1944 when it was transferred to 7. Armee. The corps commander was General der Infanterie Franz Beyer.

276. Volks-Grenadier-Division

Following the almost complete destruction of the 276. Infanterie-Division in Normandy, a new 276. Volks-Grenadier-Division had came into being in Poland when the number of the 580. Volks-Grenadier-Division was changed in September 4. Rebuilt around wounded veterans not long out of the hospital, the division was in poor shape, deficient in leadership and poorly motivated. It was moved west from Poland on November 15 and completed it organization in the area between Bitburg and Echternach, although to mislead both local population and Allied intelligence companies exchanged billets frequently. It moved up to the starting line between 352 VGD and 212 VGD during the two nights preceding the attack yet none of the StuGs supposedly allotted its Stu.Gesch.Kp. 1276 at Milowitz.

212. Volks-Grenadier-Division

after three years on the Eastern Front the 212. Infanterie-Division had been badly shattered in the Autumn of 1944 during the withdrawal on the Lithuanian sector and its remnants brought back to Schieratz in Poland for refitting. They were incorporated into the 587.Volks-Grenadier-Division assembling there, and the new division was renamed 212.Volks-Grenadier-Division on September 17. Contrary to what happened with 276. VGD, the outcome was not to prove a disappointment. At almost full strength in manpower and well-proven commanders, Brandenburger regarded it as his best division. It had left Poland at the begining of November and taken part of the West Wall south of Echternach. When moved north to reach its start line on the eve of the attack only five StuGs had arrived from Mielau with its Stu.Gesch.Kp.1212.

LIII.Armeekorps

The LIII. Armeekorps was frmed at Danzig on November 11, 1944 from Generalkommando von Rothkirch which had previously controlled the area on the Eastern Front. It then moved west and was given responsibility for the southern wing of 7.Armee. The corps commander was General der Kavallerie Friedrich-Wilhelm von Rothkirch. The forces under LIII. Armeekorps command had the job of anchroing the left wing of 7. Armee along the rugged ‘moat’ of the Sauer and Moselle rovers, and consisted of a motely collection of low-grade units: a punishment battalion, Fest.Inf.Btl.XIII/999; a machine gun battalion of fortress troops, Fest.M.G. Btl.44; and, well to the rear, and army school near Trier.

Engineers

Despite the fact that 7. Armee faced two wide rivers-the Our and the Saur -along the whole of its front, it was not provided the necessary additional engineer units. On December 12 Brandenberger complained to Jodl about this ‘catastrophic situation’ but his army was given no more and had to make due with the following:
a) three engineer battalions-
two battalions of Pi.Brig.(mot.) 47, and Baupionier-Btl.677;
 b) one bridge building battalion-
Pi.Brük.Btl.605;
c) four bridge columns equipped with Brückengerät B-
Brücko 964, Brücko 965, Brücko 966 and Brücko 961;
d) one bridging columns equipped with with Brückengerät J-
Brücko 974.
  Also assigned to the army were two regiments of OT-Brigade 1.

Assault Units

The 7.Armee was alloted a battalion armed with static anti-tank guns, namely s.Pz.Jg.Abt. 501 (fest), and two battalions of towed anti-tank guns, Pz.Jg.Abt. (mot.Z.) 657 and Pz.Jg.Abt. (mot.Z.) 668.

Artillery

Augmenting the artillery strength of its four divisions, 7. Armee was allotted:
a) two volks-artillerie corps-
Volks-Art.Korps.406 and Volks-Art.Korps 408;
b) two volks-werfer-brigades-
Volks-Werf.Brig. 8 and Volks-Werf.Brig. 18;
c)five heavy batteries
H.Art.Bttr.1092, H.Art.Bttr. 1093,  H.Art.Bttr. 1124, H.Art.Bttr. 1125 and
H.Art.Bttr.660;
d)one heavy mortar battery-
Mörs.Battr.1122.
  This gave the 7. Armee a total of 381 guns (just 76 of them 150mm or over) and 248 rocket launchers. Of these, 140 were 150mm, 54 were 210mm and 54 were 30mm.

CHRIST ALMIGHTY I HAVE MANAGED TO LIST EVERY F**KING GERMAN UNIT IN THE ARDENNES!

The German plan for the bulk of units in ‘Wacht am Rhein’.

LXVII. Armeekorps stopped on the northern flank

On the right wing, Generalleutnant Otto Hirtzfeld’s LXVII. Armeekorps (sometimes called Korps Monschau), commanding 272. and 326. Volksgrenadier-Divisions, appeared to have a fairly feasible task by comparison with the far-flung 6. Panzer-Armee as a whole. the 32. Volksgrenadier-Div. was to attack with two of its regiments on either side of Monschau and push forward astride the Eupen-Monschau road. On the left, its third regiment was to advance towards Kalterherberg, while on the right the 272. Volksgren.-Div. was to attack north-west through Konzen to gain the high ground stretching as far as the River Vesdre. Along the line of the Vesdre, between Eupen and Rötgen, LXVII. Armeekorps’ two divisions would then form the eastern part of the defensive front shielding 6.Panzer-Armee’s right flank. Accoring to the Heeresgruppe B daily situation maps, the 272. Volks-Grenadier-Division possessed about ten assault guns, but those intended for the 326. Volks-Grenadier-Division were said by the divisional commander, Oberst Erwin Kaschner, to have been ‘taken away from the division, not having been employed by it owning the situation and the terrain difficulties.’
  Yet although LXVII. Armeekorps’ task seemed feasible enough, Hitzfeld simply did not have the strength required. Because of intense American pressure around Kesternich the attack by 272.VGD had to be scrubbed, and one of 326.VGD battalions had to be sent to help restore the line. When another battalion failed to reach the assembly area in time for the attack, that left Hirtzfeld with a single, much depleted division to with which was to take Monschau!
 Oposite, the Höfen - Monschau sector was held by the US 3rd battalion of the 395th Infantry Regiment and elements of the 38th Cavalry Reconnaissance squadron supported by artillery and self propelled tank-destroyers.
  At the end of the Artillery barrage erupted along the entire 6.Panzer-Armee front early December 16, the ancient timber framed buildings of Monschau had been spared destruction as specified by Model. The Grenadiers suffered heavily in frontal attacks against the well-organized American positions. Moving forward through the mist as first light they closed with the defenders time and again almost at point blank range - in at least three verified instances toppling into the foxholes  from where they were being fired upon. A renewed attempt was made, but with no greater success and, when the troops were withdrawn to their start-line that evening, Oberst Kaschner put their losses at around 20 percent.

For my peers who cheered me on during this rather insane load of words and information, it is much appreciated. I hope folks keen on their WWII History to read these ‘Wacht am Rhein’ and ‘Nordwind’ (READ: Ardennes) posts.

I thank each and everyone of you for your kind words and understanding.
Some of you replied to a few of my rant posts, I am sorry I did not reply back, as I was busy chipping away at the posts.

I know it looks very narcissistic of me to reblog this, but please hear me out. This is one of the most solid things that a person could have ever done for me on the ole Tumb-screws. Kamfgruppe, I owe you big time brother.